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Abstract 
We conduct the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) valuation of two nonprofit organizations: Syracuse University and 
Indiana University. We transform nonprofits to for-profits by converting nonprofit social benefit to net earnings and by 
adopting for-profit cost of equity and tax rate. These adjustments attempt to capture considerable hidden value to 
equityholders. We find that in the best scenario, the net worth (market value of equity) could be about 2 times the book 
equity for both universities in June 2017. 
Keywords: DCF valuation, nonprofit universities, value creation, social benefit 
1. Introduction 
Nonprofit universities in the U.S. distribute most of their earnings as scholarship and financial aid to students, pay zero 
tax, and incur zero cost for financing with donated equity capital. This poses two challenges to financial analyses of 
such institutions. First, it is difficult to estimate their net worth (market value of equity) due to their low levels of net 
earnings and free cash flows as well as zero cost of equity. Second, it is difficult to directly compare nonprofits with 
for-profits in terms of financial performance and net worth. 
Recent literature has explored several corporate finance aspects of nonprofit institutions. Adelino, Lewellen, and 
Sundaram (2015) examine the investment-cash flow sensitivity for nonprofit hospitals and find it similar to that for 
shareholder-owned corporations. Jegers (2011a) shows the existence of financing constraints when nonprofits have no 
substantial fundraising opportunities to increase revenues and their managers are unwilling to exert high fundraising 
efforts. Jegers (2011b) detects that tighter equity constraints are associated with more debts to total assets for Belgian 
nonprofits. Jegers and Verschueren (2006) argue that equity is cheaper than debt for nonprofits, and report that almost 
half of Californian nonprofits use no debts at all. Based on their profitability study of Norwegian banks, Bøhren and 
Josefsen (2013) report that stockholder-owned banks do not outperform nonprofit ones. Kalodimos (2017) documents 
that stronger internal governance of nonprofit hospitals results in better performance as measured by the heart attack 
survival probability. With their investigation of the hospital takeover market, Gertler and Kuan (2009) find that a 
nonprofit hospital tends to be sold at a lower price to a “like-minded” nonprofit buyer than to a for-profit buyer, by the 
measure of Tobin‟s q. 
We conduct the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) valuation of nonprofit universities in this paper. The DCF valuation of 
for-profit companies has been fully illustrated by Pinto, Henry, Robinson, and Stowe (2015), Koller, Goedhart, and 
Wessels (2015), and Damodaran (2012 and 2018). Given the nonprofit problems of low earnings and zero equity cost, 
we adjust nonprofit net earnings, free cash flows to equityholders (FCFE), cost of equity, and tax rate to fit into the 
for-profit model. This way, the nonprofit net worth can be estimated when acquired by for-profits. Since the DCF 
approach is mainly for analyzing a concentrated investment (rather than a diversified investment), it is neither possible 
nor necessary to test a large sample of institutions. Thereby, we choose two representative universities (private and 
public each) to parse their DCF valuation in detail. Syracuse University (SU) at Syracuse, New York is a nonprofit 
private organization that does not receive any government appropriations. Indiana University (IU) at Bloomington, 
Indiana, with a few other branches located in the state, is a nonprofit public organization that receives state 
appropriations. For both, the current time refers to June 2017, and the 10-year historical period ranges from June 2007 
to June 2017. The potential investors or acquirers are assumed to be for-profit publicly traded companies in the 
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education industry. We collect the financial reports and other information of SU and IU from their public sources and 
obtain the data of the education industry from the website of Professor Damodaran. (Note 1) Two DCF methods, 
Economic Profit to Equityholders (EP to Equityholders) and Free Cash Flow to Equityholders (FCFE), are applied in 
the valuation process. The forecasting of future earnings, cash flows, and discount rate is based on the view of for-profit 
acquirers. Such analysis does not apply to the situation in which the potential acquirers are governments or nonprofit 
organizations, since different types of investors hold different perspectives on the value of an acquisition target. 
Our study yields several findings. First, by transforming nonprofits to for-profits, it captures a considerable Market 
Value Added (MVA) to equityholders. In the best scenario, as we find, the net worth could be about 2 times the book 
equity for both SU and IU in June 2017. Second, with the net worth breaking even at the book equity, we show that 
about half of the existing social benefit could be converted to net earnings, while the rest could be distributed to 
students. Third, when changing from a nonprofit to a for-profit status, the universities would lose some 
public-and-government-supported fund revenues, but this potential loss could be offset by a potential increase in tuition 
revenues. A nonprofit private university like SU seems more likely to achieve such a task than a nonprofit public 
university like IU because the former relies much less on the supported fund revenues than the latter. 
In all, our study provides two contributions to the valuation literature. First, it demonstrates the DCF valuation of 
nonprofit universities from the view of for-profit acquirers. Such analysis could not be easily conducted in the past due 
to the unique financial features of nonprofits. Second, it reveals the relationship between institutional fundamentals and 
net worth. Such exploration is crucial to the value creation process of nonprofit organizations. It can only be achieved 
by the DCF approach, while other approaches, such as relative valuation and asset valuation, tend to have a limited 
association with fundamentals. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the DCF valuation process. Section 3 discusses 
the summary data of potential acquirers and acquisition targets. Section 4 analyzes the net worth valuation results, with 
the nonprofit social benefit fully converted to net earnings. Section 5 explores the partial social benefit conversion, with 
the net worth breaking even at the book equity. Section 6 draws the conclusions. 
2. DCF Valuation Process 
We use two DCF methods to estimate the net worth, by following Pinto, Henry, Robinson, and Stowe (2015), Koller, 
Goedhart, and Wessels (2015), and Damodaran (2012). Based on the first method, the net worth is calculated as the 
current book equity plus the present value of expected future EPs to Equityholders. Based on the second method, the net 
worth is calculated as the present value of expected future FCFEs. 
Nonprofit universities provide substantial social benefit, such as granting scholarship and financial aid to students each 
year. Here, the social benefit denotes the amount of money that could be earned by the university as net earnings, but 
instead is distributed to the public for free. In theory, nonprofit organizations are tax free and they distribute all their 
profits to students as social benefit, leading to zero net earnings as well as zero return on equity. In addition, their equity 
financing comes from donations, incurring zero cost of equity. With zero return on equity and zero cost of equity, the 
annual EP to equityholders becomes zero, and the MVA to equityholders also becomes zero. Therefore, the net worth is 
equal to the book value of equity. In practice, nonprofits usually retain some profits, giving rise to positive net earnings. 
But their net earnings tend to be low, as indicated by the unadjusted net profit margin and return on equity measures. 
(Note 2) 
When a nonprofit university is purchased by a for-profit company, the tax payment becomes required, the social benefit 
distribution becomes non-required, and the cost of equity becomes larger than zero. In this transformation, the amount 
of social benefit distribution is converted to net earnings, capturing an MVA to equityholders. The discount rate is 
defined as the cost of equity of the potential acquirer. The tax calculation is based on the tax rate of the acquirer. 
Meanwhile, as it changes itself from a nonprofit to a for-profit organization, a university would lose some 
public-and-government-supported fund revenues, such as gifts (or contributions), grants and contracts, and state 
appropriations. We assume that the potential loss in these fund revenues would be offset by the potential increase in 
tuition revenues. That is, the total revenues would not be affected by this change. 
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Table 1. DCF valuation process 
Panel A. All methods 
Current time June 2017 
Past 10 years June 2007 to June 2017 
Future growth pattern One-stage constant growth rate for the university 
Future growth rate (g) 
First proxy 
The first proxy is the geometric average growth rate of the university‟s adjusted net earnings in 
the past 10 years. 
Future growth rate (g) 
Second proxy 
The second proxy is the geometric average growth rate of the university‟s revenues in the past 10 
years. 
Future cost of equity (k) Proxied by the average cost of equity of the education industry in the past 10 years 
BE0 Book equity of the university at the current time 
Panel B. EP to Equityholders method 
Adjusted net earnings (Reported net earnings  
+ Reported scholarship and financial aid * % of social benefit converted) 
*(1-tax rate) 
Adjusted ROE Adjusted return on equity 
Calculated as the adjusted net earnings divided by prior book equity.  
Future ROE Proxied by the average adjusted ROE in the past 10 years. 
EP1 Economic profit to equityholders in future year 1 
EP1 = BE0*(Future ROE – k) 
NW0 Net worth of the university at the current time 
NW0 = BE0 + MVA, where MVA = EP1/(k–g) 
Panel C. FCFE method 
FCFE FCFE = Cash flow from operations – Investment in fixed capital + Net borrowing 
Adjusted FCFE Adjusted FCFE = FCFE – Reported net earnings + Adjusted net earnings 
Adjusted FOE Adjusted FCFE on equity 
Calculated as the adjusted FCFE divided by prior book equity. 
Future FOE Proxied by the average adjusted FOE in the past 10 years. 
FCFE1 Free cash flows to equityholders in future year 1 
FCFE1 = BE0*Future FOE 
NW0 Net worth of the university at the current time 
NW0= FCFE1 / (k–g) 
 
Table 1 presents the DCF valuation process. Panel A provides illustrations for all the methods used, Panel B for the EP 
to Equityholders method, and Panel C for the FCFE method. In Panel A of Table 1, the future growth pattern is set up 
as one-stage constant growth because both the student enrollment and the total revenues of the two universities have 
climbed slowly in the past. It seems unnecessary to use a two-stage or three-stage pattern. The future growth rate (g) has 
two proxies: one is based on the average growth rate of the university‟s adjusted net earnings in the past 10 years, and 
the other, the average growth rate of the university‟s revenues in the past 10 years. The future cost of equity (k) is 
proxied by the average cost of equity of the education industry in the past 10 years. 
In Panel B of Table 1, the future return on equity (ROE) is proxied by the average adjusted ROE in the past 10 years, 
and the adjusted ROE is estimated as the adjusted net earnings divided by the prior book equity. The adjustment of net 
earnings is made by adding the converted amount of social benefit to the reported net earnings, and by paying taxes. See 
Equation (1) below for the definition of the adjusted net earnings. 
Adjusted net earnings 
= (Reported net earnings 
+ Reported scholarship and financial aid * % of social benefit converted) 
* (1-tax rate).                               (1) 
Specifically, the reported net earnings refer to the increase in net assets, i.e., the bottom line of the income statement. 
The tax rate means the newly updated marginal tax rate (21%) instead of the old rate (35%), because the purpose of this 
calculation is to estimate the future ROE. Finally, the net worth at the current time (NW0) is equal to the current book 
equity (BE0) plus the MVA, where the MVA is equal to the projected economic profit to equityholders in future year1 
(EP1) divided by the difference between cost of equity and growth rate, and the economic profit (EP1) is equal to the 
current book equity multiplied by the difference between the future ROE and the future cost of equity. See Equation (2) 
below for the net worth calculation. 
NW0 = BE0 + MVA,                                       (2) 
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where MVA = EP1/(k–g), and EP1 = BE0*(Future ROE – k). 
In Panel C of Table 1, the future FCFE on equity (FOE) is proxied by the average adjusted FOE in the past 10 years, 
and the adjusted FOE is estimated as the adjusted FCFE divided by the prior book equity. The adjustment of free cash 
flows is made by subtracting the reported net earnings and adding the adjusted net earnings, as presented in Equation (3) 
below. 
Adjusted FCFE = FCFE – Reported net earnings + Adjusted net earnings,                   (3) 
 
where FCFE = Cash flow from operations – Investment in fixed capital + Net borrowing. Lastly, the net worth at the 
current time (NW0) is equal to the projected FCFE in future year1 (FCFE1) divided by the difference between cost of 
equity and growth rate, as displayed in Equation (4) below. 
NW0= FCFE1 / (k–g),               (4) 
where FCFE1 = BE0*Future FOE. 
 
3. Summary Data of Acquirers and Targets 
For-profit publicly traded companies in educational services are regarded as potential acquirers. Table 2 provides 
summary data of education companies. The average cost of equity is 8.24%, which will be used as the future discount 
rate in valuing SU and IU. The average percentage of equity out of capital (based on market measures) is as high as 
83.73%, implying a financing structure of light debt and heavy equity. We presume that both the cost of equity and the 
equity to capital ratio will remain constant in the future for the acquirers. Since the tax rate was reduced in January 2018, 
the new rate (21%) will be used to estimate the future ROE and the future FOE for SU and IU. The average growth in 
net income (7.51%), the average growth in revenues (7.68%), the average ROE (12.95%), and the average price/book 
ratio (3.59) are much higher than the current growth in net income (-10.92%), the current growth in revenues (-3.90%), 
the current ROE (3.10%), and the current price/book ratio (1.95), respectively. The results suggest better performance 
historically than currently for education companies. The current price/book ratio (1.95) denotes that the net worth of 
education companies is nearly 2 times the book equity in 2017. 
 
Table 2. Summary data of education companies 
 Current year 10-year average Future years 
Cost of equity 9.42% 8.24% 8.24% 
Equity/Capital 74.97% 83.73%  
Marginal tax rate 35% 35% 21% 
Historical 5-year average growth in net income -10.92% 7.51%  
Historical 5-year average growth in revenues -3.90% 7.68%  
ROE 3.10% 12.95%  
Price/Book ratio 1.95 3.59  
 
SU and IU are treated as acquisition targets. Table 3 provides summary data of the targets. Panel A reports the 
current-year data, and Panel B, the 10-year-average data. In Panel A of Table 3, we note that the two universities are 
large and comprehensive in general. Specifically, SU is smaller than IU in terms of student enrollment (21,970 vs. 
94,698), total revenues ($1.0 billion vs. $3.2 billion), total assets ($2.9 billion vs. $5.5 billion), and book equity ($2.0 
billion vs. $3.9 billion). The per-student tuition and fees are much higher for SU as a private university than for IU as a 
public university ($39,907 vs. $15,337). 
In Panel B of Table 3, first, we find that both the student enrollment and the total revenues of the two universities grow 
slowly in the past 10 years. The growth rate of student enrollment is 1.42% for SU and 0.24% for IU. The growth rate 
of revenues is 2.43% for SU and 2.81% for IU. 
Second, pertaining to the income statement, the student tuition and fee revenues out of total revenues are 84.62% for SU 
vs. 41.86% for IU. The public-and-government-supported fund revenues out of total revenues, including gifts (or 
contributions), grants and contracts, and state appropriations, are 17.59% for SU vs. 41.82% for IU. Additionally, these 
fund revenues divided by the student tuition and fees are 20.89% for SU vs. 100.86% for IU. Therefore, SU relies much 
less on supported fund revenues than IU. It is noted that SU as a private university receives zero state appropriations. IU 
as a public university receives considerable amount of state appropriations, which are 19% out of total revenues and are 
equivalent to 45.99% of student tuition and fees. The costs of scholarship and financial aid out of total revenues are 
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31.21% for SU vs. 11.99% for IU; and these costs divided by the student tuition and fees are 36.87% for SU vs. 28.59% 
for IU. That is to say, SU distributes more social benefit to students than IU, since the former charges much higher 
per-student tuition and fees than the latter. The instructional costs out of total revenues are similar for the two 
universities (38.47% vs. 34.34%). 
Third, with regard to the balance sheet, the asset turnover (total revenues divided by total assets) is 34.39% for SU vs. 
61.43% for IU, suggesting that IU is more efficient in asset usage. The non-current assets contain two major items: the 
investments which are financial securities such as stocks and bonds, and the fixed assets which are long-term physical 
assets such as land, land improvements, buildings, and equipment. The investments out of total assets are 45.30% for 
SU vs. 26.45% for IU, and the fixed assets out of total assets are 39.77% for SU vs. 55.05% for IU. Thus, SU endures 
more risk exposure to financial markets. The capital structure measures are similar to those of the education companies, 
including the long-term debts to total assets ratio (15.75% for SU vs. 19.04% for IU), the book equity to total assets 
ratio (69.05% for SU vs. 67.14% for IU), and the book equity to capital ratio (81.46% for SU vs. 76.67% for IU). Thus, 
SU and IU have a capital structure of light debt and heavy equity. 
 
Table 3. Summary data of universities 
Panel A. Current-year data (2017) 
 Syracuse University Indiana University 
Enrollment of students 21,970 94,698 
Total revenues ($million) 995 3,193 
Net earnings ($million) (unadjusted) 198 154 
Total assets ($million) 2,852 5,474 
Book equity ($million) 2,018 3,866 
Student tuition and fees per student ($) 39,907 15,337 
Panel B. 10-year-average data (2007-2017) 
Annual enrollment growth 1.42% 0.24% 
Annual revenue growth 2.43% 2.81% 
   
Student tuition and fees/Total revenues 84.62% 41.86% 
Gifts (or contributions)/Total revenues 7.65% 3.49% 
Grants and contracts/Total revenues 9.94% 19.33% 
State appropriations/Total revenues 0.00% 19.00% 
Scholarship & financial aid/Total revenues 31.21% 11.99% 
Instructional costs/Total revenues 38.47% 34.34% 
Net earnings/Total revenues (unadjusted) 1.88% 6.45% 
Gifts (or contributions)/Student tuition and fees 9.16% 8.33% 
Grants and contracts/Student tuition and fees 11.73% 46.54% 
State appropriations/Student tuition and fees 0.00% 45.99% 
Scholarship & financial aid/Student tuition and fees 36.87% 28.59% 
   
Total revenues/Total assets 34.39% 61.43% 
Investments/Total assets 45.30% 26.45% 
Fixed assets/Total assets 39.77% 55.05% 
Long-term debts/Total assets 15.75% 19.04% 
Book equity/Total assets 69.05% 67.14% 
Book equity/Capital 81.46% 76.67% 
   
ROE (unadjusted) 1.99% 6.42% 
FOE (unadjusted) -1.50% 1.84% 
 
Finally, the net earnings, the net margin (net earnings divided by total revenues), the ROE, and the FOE are unadjusted 
for social benefit conversion. It is noted that the unadjusted 10-year average ROE is 1.99% for SU and 6.42% for IU, 
which are much lower than the average ROE of education companies (12.95%). The unadjusted 10-year average FOE is 
-1.50% for SU and 1.84% for IU, which are also quite low. Since SU and IU dispense some profits as social benefit 
each year, they end up with low levels of net earnings and free cash flows to equityholders as well as low ROE and 
FOE ratios. If the unadjusted average ROE and FOE are used to forecast future net earnings and free cash flows, and if 
the for-profit cost of equity (8.24%) is used as the discount rate, the estimated net worth would be much lower than the 
book equity, and the MVA to equityholders would be negative. 
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4. Valuation Results: Full Conversion of Social Benefit 
The analysis in this section is based on the best-scenario assumptions summarized as follows. First, the existing social 
benefit is fully converted to net earnings, i.e., 100% of scholarship and financial aid are not distributed to students any 
longer; instead, they are converted to profits. Second, the potential loss of the public-and-government-supported fund 
revenues is offset by the potential increase in tuition revenues. That is to say, the total revenues remain the same. 
 
Table 4. Valuation results: full conversion of social benefit 
Panel A. Inputs and assumptions 
 Syracuse University Indiana University 
 Earnings growth Revenues growth Earnings growth Revenues growth 
Future growth rate (g) 3.74% 2.43% 4.38% 2.81% 
Future cost of equity (k) 8.24% 8.24% 8.24% 8.24% 
BE0 ($million) 2,017.59 2,017.59 3,865.54 3,865.54 
% of social benefit converted 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Panel B. EP to Equityholders method 
Future ROE 14.12% 14.12% 14.22% 14.22% 
EP1 ($million) 118.78 118.78 231.25 231.25 
NW0 ($million) 4,658.39 4,065.13 9,868.44 8,130.68 
NW0/BE0 2.31 2.01 2.55 2.10 
Panel C. FCFE method 
Future FOE 10.62% 10.62% 9.63% 9.63% 
FCFE1 ($million) 214.36 214.36 372.33 372.33 
NW0 ($million) 4,765.74 3,695.10 9,665.19 6,867.24 
NW0/BE0 2.36 1.83 2.50 1.78 
 
Table 4 reports the net worth valuation results for SU and IU, assuming social benefit fully converted to earnings. Panel 
A provides the inputs and assumptions for all methods used. Panel B provides the results for the EP to Equityholders 
method, and Panel C for the FCFE method. In Panel A of Table 4, the growth rate based on historical adjusted net 
earnings is 3.74% for SU and 4.38% for IU, and the growth rate based on historical revenues is 2.43% for SU and 2.81% 
for IU. They are much lower than the average growth rates of education companies (7.51% and 7.68%). Thus, it seems 
proper to employ a one-stage constant growth pattern in the valuation of SU and IU. The capital structure of SU and IU 
is similar to that of the education companies, as supported by the data in Tables 2 and 3. Moreover, the discount rate 
used in the valuation process refers to the acquirers‟ cost of equity, and it is assumed to stay the same in the future. 
Therefore, the future cost of equity does not need to be adjusted for any change in capital structure. Finally, we assume 
that 100% of social benefit is converted to net earnings. 
In Panel B of Table 4, the future ROE (based on adjusted net earnings) is 14.12% for SU and 14.22% for IU, roughly in 
line with the average ROE of education companies (12.95%). For both universities, since the future ROE is larger than 
the cost of equity (8.24%), the annual economic profit and the MVA to equityholders are positive, and the net worth 
exceeds the book equity. As shown, the net worth of SU is estimated to be $4.1 to $4.7 billion, which is 2.01 to 2.31 
times the book equity. The net worth of IU is estimated to be $8.1 to $9.9 billion, which is 2.10 to 2.55 times the book 
equity. 
In Panel C of Table 4, the future FOE (based on adjusted free cash flows) is 10.62% for SU and 9.63% for IU. As 
displayed, the net worth of SU is estimated to be $3.7 to $4.8 billion, which is 1.83 to 2.36 times the book equity. The 
net worth of IU is estimated to be $6.9 to $9.7 billion, which is 1.78 to 2.50 times the book equity. 
5. Breakeven: Partial Conversion of Social Benefit 
In the previous section, we report that the estimated net worth is higher than the book equity based on the best-scenario 
assumptions. In this section, we assume that less than 100% of social benefit is converted to profits. That is, one part of 
existing social benefit is converted to net earnings, and the other part is distributed to students as scholarship and 
financial aid. With lower adjusted net earnings and lower adjusted free cash flows, the net worth would become lower. 
If the net worth is reduced to the level of book equity (i.e., the breakeven situation), the required percentage of social 
benefit conversion can be estimated. 
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Table 5. Breakeven: partial conversion of social benefit 
Panel A. Inputs and assumptions 
 Syracuse University Indiana University 
 Earnings growth Revenues growth Earnings growth Revenues growth 
Future growth rate (g) 3.74% 2.43% 4.38% 2.81% 
Future cost of equity (k) 8.24% 8.24% 8.24% 8.24% 
BE0 ($million) 2,017.59 2,017.59 3,865.54 3,865.54 
NW0 ($million) 2,017.59 2,017.59 3,865.54 3,865.54 
NW0/BE0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Panel B. EP to Equityholders method 
Future ROE 8.24% 8.24% 8.24% 8.24% 
EP1 ($million) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
% of social benefit converted 53.08% 53.08% 34.56% 34.56% 
Panel C. FCFE method 
Future FOE 4.50% 5.80% 3.85% 5.42% 
FCFE1 ($million) 90.75 117.04 148.91 209.58 
% of social benefit converted 51.17% 61.56% 36.78% 53.95% 
 
Table 5 reports the breakeven results for SU and IU, assuming net worth equal to book equity. In Pane A of Table 5, the 
growth rates, the cost of equity, and the book equity are the same as those in Panel A of Table 4. For the breakeven 
assumption, we set the net worth equal to the book equity. Thus, the net worth to book equity ratio is 1.00 accordingly. 
In Panel B of Table 5, the future ROE is equal to the cost of equity, and the annual economic profit is zero, implying 
zero MVA to equityholders. Both the future ROE and EP1 are lower than those in Panel B of Table 4. In this situation, 
SU needs to convert 53.08% of existing social benefit to net earnings, and IU, 34.56%. 
In Panel C of Table 5, the future FOE is 4.50% to 5.80% for SU and 3.85% to 5.42% for IU. Both the future FOE and 
FCFE1 are lower than those in Panel C of Table 4. In this situation, SU needs to convert 51.17% to 61.56% of existing 
social benefit to net earnings, and IU, 36.78% to 53.95%. 
6. Conclusions 
We use the DCF approach to estimate the net worth for two nonprofit universities: SU and IU, assuming they are the 
targets of acquisition by for-profits. We transform nonprofits to for-profits by converting nonprofit social benefit to net 
earnings and by adopting for-profit cost of equity and tax rate. These adjustments capture considerable hidden value to 
equityholders. The following provides a summary of our main results. 
First, by using different valuation methods (EP to Equityholders and FCFE) and different growth rates (earnings and 
revenues), we show that based on the best-scenario assumptions, the net worth to book equity ratio is 1.83 to 2.36 for 
SU and 1.78 to 2.55 for IU in June 2017. These ratios of SU and IU are by and large consistent with the price/book ratio 
(1.95) of the for-profit education companies at the same time. Our best-scenario results can be regarded as the highest 
limits for the net worth in June 2017, and they are obtained under two conditions. That is, the existing social benefit 
could be fully converted to net earnings, and the potential loss of the public-and-government-supported fund revenues 
could be offset by the potential increase in tuition revenues. It is necessary to point out that the best-scenario results 
may be unrealistic in a real-world acquisition. They merely sketch the upper boundary in an ideal situation. The realistic 
values tend to lie below the upper boundary. Even so, the net worth is still likely to exceed the book equity, implying a 
positive MVA to equityholders. 
Second, when the net worth breaks even at the book equity, as we find, SU needs to convert 51.17% to 61.62% of 
existing social benefit to net earnings, and IU, 34.56% to 53.95%, while the rest is distributed to students as scholarship 
and financial aid. 
Third, when acquired by for-profit companies, SU and IU in the worst situation would lose all the fund revenues (gifts 
or contributions, grants and contracts, and state appropriations). To make up for these losses and to maintain the same 
levels of total revenues, SU would have to increase tuition revenues by 20.89%, and IU, 100.86%. Therefore, SU relies 
much less on the public-and-government-supported fund revenues than IU. This is in line with the fact that the former 
charges much higher per-student tuition and fees than the latter. 
Given the above findings, it is our responsibility to declare the constraints of our work. First, this study is not an 
all-around assessment of the nonprofit net worth. In an actual M&A deal, strategic changes of nonprofits as they 
become for-profits need to be addressed, control premium and illiquidity discount need to be considered, and other 
valuation approaches need to be involved. Second, between the buyer and the seller and among diverse buyers, 
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valuation results are inclined to vary due to various perspectives. Third, in a different time, the macroeconomic, 
industrial, and institutional conditions may differ from those in June 2017, leading to different valuation results. 
Please note that the discussions in this paper do not represent opinions of any universities or any potential investors. 
They are only academic inquiries of the authors, and they serve as a discussion of nonprofit valuation in order to induce 
further inquiries. 
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Notes 
Note 1. The website of SU is www.syracuse.edu. The website of IU is www.iu.edu. The website of Damodaran is 
pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/dataarchived.html. 
Note 2. As Table 3 shows, the unadjusted net profit margin (i.e., net earnings/total revenues) is 1.88% for SU and 6.45% 
for IU, and the unadjusted return on equity (ROE) is 1.99% for SU and 6.42% for IU. These numbers are much lower 
than those of S&P 500 index at the same time. 
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